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TOBACCO CONTROL AND SNUS:
TIME TO TAKE A STAND
LINDSEY C. DASTRUP*
JACQUELINE M. MCNAMARA**
INTRODUCTION
If you are like most Americans, you have never heard of snus. But if you are
part of the public health community, you have found yourself in the midst of a
bitter debate over the potential role snus may play in tobacco cessation and harm-
reduction efforts. Snus (rhymes with juice) is a smokeless, spitless, moist-ground
tobacco product that has been manufactured in Sweden for over a century but is
new to the U.S.1 It comes in small, teabag-like pouches that a user discreetly places
behind the upper lip for half an hour to an hour while the product delivers nicotine
to the body.2
The current debate about snus is a result of the fact that some public health
advocates argue that the product is safe enough to be recommended as an
altemative to smoking, and point to the "Swedish experience" to support the claim
Copyright © 2008 by Lindsey C. Dastrup and Jacqueline M. McNamara.
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magna cum laude, 2006, Brigham Young University (Provo, UT). I would like to thank my co-author for
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my husband for his constant love and support.
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1. Snus is a form of smokeless tobacco, but is distinguishable from other types of smokeless
tobacco that have been sold in the U.S. for decades. The primary traditional types of U.S. smokeless
tobacco are chewing tobacco and dry or moist snuff. They are primarily used orally and require spitting.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smoking & Tobacco Use,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/datastatistics/Factsheets/smokelesstobacco.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2008). Snus is a form of moist snuff that does not require spitting. J. Foulds et al., Effect of Smokeless
Tobacco (Snus) on Smoking and Public Health in Sweden, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 349, 349-50 (2003).
Snus currently being sold in the U.S. is pouched and flavored. See Camel Snus,
http://www.camelsnus.com (follow "All About Snus" hyperlink; then follow "Got Questions" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008). The tobacco in snus has a different taste from the tobacco in other
smokeless tobacco products because of snus's unique manufacturing process. Foulds et al., supra at
349-50.
2. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 349.
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that the U.S. may realize an overall public health benefit from the introduction of
snus. 3 Other public health experts, however, believe that no tobacco product should
ever be promoted, and support continued use of the "no safe tobacco product"
message.4 Given the less-than-certain health effects of snus, s the questionable effect
that the product would have on the tobacco-use habits of Americans, and the
contentious prospect of the public health community and "Big Tobacco" teaming
up, the heated nature of the debate is understandable. Nevertheless, the public
health community must devise a way to respond cohesively to the new tobacco
threat that is snus or risk losing the progress made in tobacco control over the past
several decades.
This comment expounds upon the debate about snus and discusses various
steps that the public health community, together with appropriate government
officials, legislators, policymakers, and the legal community, should take to address
the introduction of snus to the U.S. market. First, the comment provides an
overview of the debate about snus, concluding that although the case for promoting
snus as a harm-reduction measure may be initially appealing, snus is more likely to
add to the U.S. tobacco problem than help solve it. 6 Therefore, the public health
community should have no part in promoting snus.
Next, this comment offers pragmatic suggestions on how tobacco control
advocates can minimize the potential adverse effects of snus. First, banning snus
from the U.S. market is the most direct way to further the goals of tobacco control;
however, for political reasons, this approach may be unrealistic. 7 Thus, this
comment argues for the need to pass the proposed legislation currently before
Congress that would grant the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to
regulate tobacco products and would enable the agency to ensure that snus sold in
the U.S. meets certain product standards and is not marketed to young people.
8
Federal regulation of tobacco products is vital to help prevent snus from becoming
the next public health crisis, but whether or not the legislation is passed, states must
independently pursue tobacco control strategies to deal with the potential negative
effects of snus. This comment briefly discusses such strategies, which include
levying appropriate taxes on the sale of snus, launching effective counter-marketing
3. Sweden, which has the highest rate of snus use, also has the lowest rate of smoking and
smoking-related diseases of any developed country. B. Rodu et al., Tobacco Use Among Swedish
Schoolchildren, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 405, 405 (2005).
4. E.g., David E. Nelson et al., Trends in Smokeless Tobacco Use Among Adults and Adolescents
in the United States, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 897, 902 (2006).
5. See Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 351-53 (demonstrating that there is no consensus on the
harms of smokeless tobacco as evidenced by different conclusions drawn from multiple smokeless
tobacco studies).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part ll.B.
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campaigns to continue efforts that discourage tobacco use in general and snus use
in particular, ensuring that snus marketing complies with the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) provisions prohibiting marketing of tobacco products to youth,
and using state consumer protection laws to challenge any misleading or deceptive
claims the tobacco industry may make in marketing snus. 9 Finally, this comment
explains the need to counterbalance the introduction of snus as a new and attractive
form of tobacco for use by smokers when they cannot smoke by introducing and
promoting new low-cost nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) products that appeal
to consumers. 0
I. OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE ABOUT SNUS
"[P]ublic health professionals and policymakers need to decide whether to
focus effort on restricting access to the most harmful products (smoked tobacco
products), or focus much time, energy, and legislation on restricting access to the
least harmful products, that under some circumstances can produce a net public
health benefit. ",1
Snus is the Swedish word for "smokeless tobacco." 12 Snus has been
manufactured in Sweden for decades using a process unlike the manufacturing
process traditionally used by makers of smokeless tobacco in the U.S. Instead of
being fire-cured and fermented, the tobacco contained in snus is treated with steam
to kill bacteria, and then packaged in cans and refrigerated. 13 This process produces
a smokeless tobacco product with significantly lower levels of cancer-causing
tobacco-specific nitrosamines (TSNAs) than other forms of smokeless tobacco.14
Five years ago, snus was sold almost exclusively by one Swedish company
only to Scandinavian consumers. 15 In 2006, however, the two largest American
cigarette manufacturers entered the U.S. smokeless tobacco market, unveiling new
products also called snus. R.J. Reynolds introduced "Camel Snus" in May 2006 for
test-marketing in Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas, and expanded test-
marketing to an additional half dozen cities in 2007.16 R.J. Reynolds announced
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part lI.D.
11. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 358 (emphasis added).
12. ANN BOONN, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, SMOKELESS TOBACCO IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2007), http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0231.pdf.
13. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 349.
14. Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Changing Smokeless Tobacco Products, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. (SuPP.), at S368, S369 (2007).
15. Jonathan Foulds & Lynn Kozlowski, Commentary, Snus-What Should the Public-Health
Response Be?, 369 LANCET 1976, 1978 (2007).
16. Jane L. Levere, No Smoke, No Foul? Critics Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at C5;
Richard Craver, Reynolds Picks Raleigh to Test Snus, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 14, 2007, at DL. Camel
snus comes in spice, frost, and original flavors. Camel Snus, supra note 1. Although is it refrigerated
2008]
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plans to test-market Camel Snus in ten additional metropolitan areas in 2008.17
Philip Morris introduced "Taboka" for test-marketing in Indianapolis, Indiana, in
July 2006, and introduced "Marlboro Snus," a similar product, for test-marketing in
the Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, area in August 2007.18 In March 2008, Philip Morris
introduced Marlboro Snus for test-marketing in Indianapolis and discontinued its
test-marketing of Taboka.
1 9
Members of the tobacco control community have recognized the potentially
huge, yet uncertain, ramifications of this introduction by the two most powerful
players in the U.S. tobacco industry-players who, in the past, have proven their
ability to attract consumers and manipulate the market.2 0 Will the introduction of
snus in the U.S. produce a new category of tobacco users and thereby undermine
the progress tobacco control has made in labeling tobacco use as an aberrant
behavior? Will the interest in snus come from current smokers who find it useful
for satisfying their nicotine craving when they cannot smoke, thereby undercutting
the public health advantage of clean indoor air laws that encourage smokers to
quit? Or will snus be used mainly by ex-smokers who would otherwise have
continued smoking and by new tobacco users who would otherwise have started to
smoke? Such questions are of vital importance in determining how the public
health community should respond to the marketing of snus in the U.S. Public health
experts, however, are divided on the answers.
The debate over snus is very much tied to the argument about harm-reduction
in general in the tobacco control community. Proponents of a harm-reduction
strategy argue that prevention and cessation programs cannot be expected to
prior to sale, it does not need to be refrigerated after purchase. Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S369-
70.
17. R.J. Reynolds Expands Snus Tests, csnews.com, Mar. 10, 2008,
http://www.csnews.com/csn/cat management/tobacco/article display.jsp?vnu contentid= 1003722971
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008). The new markets include Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Maryland, and
Chicago, Illinois. Id.
18. BOONN, supra note 12, at 3. Marlboro Snus is offered in rich, mild, mint, and spice flavors and
does not require refrigeration. Philip Morris USA, Marlboro Snus Fact Sheet,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Products/Smokeless-Tobacco/Marlboro-Snus/default.aspx
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008); Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S370.
19. PM USA Expands Marlboro Snus to Indianapolis, csnews.com, Jan. 11, 2008. Liggett Group, a
subsidiary of Vector Group Ltd., plans to test-market its own version of snus under the Grand Prix label
in seven U.S. cities starting in May 2008, including Portland, Oregon, Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, and
Indianapolis, Indiana. Unlike the American-made R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris snus products,
however, this "premium" product will be manufactured in Sweden. Liggett Group to Introduce Grand
Prix Snus, Offers Premium Quality Smokeless Tobacco Product at Value Pricing, Feb. 26, 2008,
http://www.vectorgroupltd.com/newsArticleGroup.asp?pvNewsld=211 (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
20. See Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S375 (concluding that oral tobacco products are
manufactured and marketed to appeal to smokers); Simon Chapman, Commentary, Repealing
Australia's Ban on Smokeless Tobacco? Hasten Slowly, 188 MED. J. AUSTL. 47, 48 (2008) ("The
tobacco industry has shown itself to be resourceful, rapacious and duplicitous in the service of sales
maximisation.
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eliminate smoking completely, and therefore tobacco products that provide a less
harmful alternative to cigarettes should be promoted to inveterate smokers.2 1 On the
other side of the debate, public health experts note the disastrous consequences of
promoting the "light" or "low tar" cigarette as a reduced-harm measure, an
approach that enabled the tobacco industry not only to undermine cessation and
prevention efforts,22 but to thrive financially from the growth of a whole new
segment of the cigarette market.23 The following sections discuss the two sides of
the debate and the evidence that supports them.
A. Snus's Harm-Reducing Potential
"If the goal of tobacco control is to reduce tobacco-related disease, rather
than tobacco use per se, then the promotion of snus use by inveterate smokers is a
promising public health policy. ,,24
Despite a significant decline in smoking prevalence in the past several
decades, millions of Americans continue to smoke. From 1965 to 2004, the
percentage of males who smoked declined from 52% to 23%, and the percentage of
smoking females declined from 34% to 19%.25 Although these figures seem
promising, in absolute numbers the smoking problem has not improved: 45 to 50
million Americans still smoke, and there are approximately 438,000 smoking-
related deaths each year. 26 Looking at these numbers, harm-reduction proponents
see the potential to help millions of smokers through the promotion of reduced-
harm tobacco products such as snus.27
There is no debate that use of smokeless tobacco products, especially snus,
involves fewer health risks than smoking; the debate is about the extent of risk
reduction and what difference it should make for tobacco control strategy. Certain
21. L.T. Kozlowski et al., Commentary, Some Practical Points on Harm Reduction: What to Tell
Your Lawmaker and What to Tell Your Brother About Swedish Snus, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 372, 372
(2003); see also Sherry Emery et al., Characterizing and Identifying "Hard-Core" Smokers:
Implications for Further Reducing Smoking Prevalence, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 387, 387, 393 (2000)
(describing the existence of a "hard-core smokers" group that may never quit and may require
"specifically tailored" tobacco control efforts).
22. J.E. Henningfield et al., Regulatory Strategies to Reduce Tobacco Addiction in Youth, 12
TOBACCO CONTROL (SuPP.), at i14, i 17 (2003).
23. See Edward L. Sweda, Jr. et al., Light Cigarette Lawsuits in the United States: 2007 (2007),
available at http://www.tobaccolawcenter.org/documents/lightcigarettes.pdf (discussing the U.S.
Department of Justice's light cigarette lawsuit against the tobacco industry and Judge Gladys Kessler's
findings of fact in US. v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)).
24. Coral E. Gartner et al., Should the Health Community Promote Smokeless Tobacco (Snus) as a
Harm Reduction Measure?, 4 PLOS MED. 1138, 1139 (2007) (emphasis added).
25. Brad Rodu & William T. Godshall, Tobacco Harm Reduction: An Alternative Cessation
Strategy for Inveterate Smokers, HARM REDUCTION J., Dec. 21, 2006,
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-75 17-3-37.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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studies have estimated snus use to be 90% less harmful than smoking. 28 Like other
smokeless tobacco products, snus does not involve the risk of lung cancer and
respiratory diseases that smoking does. 29 Unlike other smokeless tobacco products,
evidence suggests that snus does not increase the risk of oral cancer. Because snus
delivers similar amounts of nicotine as cigarettes, snus does not decrease the risks
associated with nicotine use, such as adverse health effects in pregnancy, possible
cardiovascular problems, and addiction. 3' Other consequences of snus include oral
lesions and dental caries. 32 Lesions are common among snus users but rarely
become malignant and seem to disappear after snus use ceases.
33
There are some disquieting health findings related to snus use. One is an
increase in the risk of pancreatic cancer, with one study estimating that using snus
doubles the risk; although this increased risk is not as great as that caused by
smoking.34 In addition, a recently published study found an association between
Scandinavian moist snuff use and gastro-esophageal cancer.35 Compared to non-
tobacco users, snus users who had reportedly never smoked were found to have 3.5
times an increased risk of esophageal squamous cell carcinoma (compared to 5.2
28. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1976; David T. Levy et al., The Relative Risks of a Low-
Nitrosamine Smokeless Tobacco Product Compared with Smoking Cigarettes: Estimates of a Panel of
Experts, 13 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 2035, 2038 (2004).
29. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 352-53; Juhua Luo et al., Oral Use of Swedish Moist Snuff(Snus)
and Risk for Cancer of the Mouth, Lung, and Pancreas in Male Construction Workers: A Retrospective
Study, 369 LANCET 2015, 2017 (2007).
30. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 351.
31. Id. at 350-53; see, e.g., Martin Lindstr6m, Nicotine Replacement Therapy, Professional
Therapy, Snuff Use and Tobacco Smoking: A Study of Smoking Cessation Strategies in Southern
Sweden, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 410, 415 (2006) (finding that the majority of Swedish smokers who
used snus as a cessation tool to quit smoking "continued to use snus daily to a very great extent," and
concluding "[t]his may be regarded as a potential health problem, considering the fact that the health
effects of daily snus use are not undisputed and partly remain to be investigated.").
32. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 351. Use of other forms of smokeless tobacco is also a risk factor
for developing oral lesions. S.L. Tomar et al., Oral Mucosal Smokeless Tobacco Lesions Among
Adolescents in the United States, 76 J. DENTAL RES. 1277, 1281-82 (1997).
33. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 35 1.
34. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1977. Other smokeless tobacco products have also been
found to increase the risk of pancreatic cancer. Smokeless Tobacco Causes Oral and Pancreatic Cancer;
Nitrosamines Classified as Human Carcinogens, NCI CANCER BULL. (Nat'l Cancer Inst.), Nov. 30,
2004, at 3, available at http://www.cancer.gov/NCICancerBulletin/NCICancer Bulletin 113004.pdf.
Thus far, it is not clear whether there is a significant difference between the increased risk of pancreatic
cancer caused by snus versus other smokeless tobacco products. See Paolo Boffetta et al., Smokeless
Tobacco Use and Risk of Cancer of the Pancreas and Other Organs, 114 LNT'L J. CANCER 992, 993
(2005) (noting that there are some U.S. studies which found an association between pancreatic cancer
and smokeless tobacco products even though the studies are of low statistical power).
35. Kazem Zendehdel et al., Risk of Gastroesophageal Cancer Among Smokers and Users of
Scandinavian Moist Snuff, 122 INT'L J. CANCER, 1095, 1099 (2008) ("Although some uncertainty
remains regarding the causality and the strength of the association as well as the generalizability to other
populations than Swedish men,... at present, Scandinavian snus cannot be considered to be without a
carcinogenic risk.").
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times for cigarette smokers) and a 40% excess risk of non-cardia stomach cancer
(virtually equal to that for cigarette smokers).36
Snus use has been part of the Swedish culture since the late 1800s and over
the years has been both more and less popular than smoking among the Swedes.37
Public health experts, however, are particularly fascinated by the changing habits of
cigarette and snus use by Swedish men over the past two decades. During that time,
cigarette consumption declined appreciably while use of snus significantly
increased.38 One study collected data from 1986 to 1999 and found that overall
tobacco consumption by Swedish males remained stable at about 40% during this
period; however, the prevalence of male smoking decreased from 23% to 14%
while the proportion of snus users increased from 22% to 30%. 39 Although snus use
has mainly been a "guy thing" in Sweden, prevalence of snus use among women
increased from 2% to 6% during this period, and smoking prevalence declined from
27% to 22%.4" In 1999, Sweden became the first country to meet the World Health
Organization's (WHO) target for smoking prevalence at a figure below 20%.41
A 2003 study by Jonathan Foulds and colleagues sought to determine whether
snus played a significant role in Sweden's success in reducing smoking.42 The
study concluded that a comparison of the smoking and snus use patterns of men
(large reduction in smoking and big increase in snus use) and women (little snus
use and smaller smoking reduction) is "strongly suggestive of snus having a direct
effect on the changes in male smoking and health.",43 The study also estimated the
net effect of snus use in Sweden on public health. Noting the substantial reduction
in the incidence of smoking-related diseases among Swedish men, including a
lower rate of male lung cancer than any other developed nation, the study
concluded that the net effect was positive, and described the "Swedish experience"
as "a concrete example in which availability of a less harmful tobacco product has
probably worked to produce a net improvement in health." The study also
rejected the claim that snus could be a "gateway" product for smoking, meaning
36. Id. at 1096, 1097.
37. Brad Rodu, Am. Council on Sci. & Health, Swedish Tobacco Use: Smoking, Smokeless, and
History (May 12, 2004), http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newslD.362/news-detail.asp.
38. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 353.
39. Id. at 354.
40. See id. at 354, 358.
41. Rodu, supra note 37. According to the United Nations Development Programme, Sweden's
adult smoking prevalence for 2002-2004 stood at approximately 18% for women and 17% for men.
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Prevalence of
Smoking, Women, http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/87.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008); United
Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Prevalence of Smoking,
Men, http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/88.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
42. Foulds et al., supra note 1, at 349.
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id. at 354-55, 358.
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that using snus would lead a person to start smoking cigarettes later on.4 5 Instead,
the study described evidence suggesting that individuals in Sweden "who start
using snus are less likely to become smokers ..... 46
The sale of snus is currently banned in the European Union (E.U.) (except for
Sweden) and in Australia.47 A 2007 study by Coral Gartner and colleagues
examined the likely effect on public health were snus to be introduced in
Australia.48 The study noted that while an individual can achieve substantial health
gains by switching from cigarettes to snus, or taking up snus instead of smoking, a
positive effect on health at the population level is likely only if snus is used mainly
by people who would otherwise have continued or commenced smoking, and not
by people who would otherwise have become or remained tobacco free. 49 Relying
on expert predictions that the group most likely to take up snus would be current
male smokers, the study concluded that the introduction of snus would be more
likely to produce a net benefit than a net harm.50
Some harm-reduction proponents are likely to seize upon the Gartner study as
one more valid rationale for not opposing the introduction of snus in the U.S., but
rather to promote snus use among inveterate smokers who want to reduce their
health risks. 51 Others in the harm-reduction camp have criticized the public health
community's failure to provide information to smokers about smokeless products
that constitute a less harmful alternative to cigarettes, citing the individual's right to
relevant health information and arguing that the "no safe tobacco product" message
violates that right.52 Because snus is new to the U.S. and because it is associated
with positive aspects of the Swedish experience, the argument that the public health
community should promote snus as a smoking alternative is gaining momentum.
Foulds and Kozlowski assert that "[i]t is a perverse public-health policy that makes
an addictive drug widely available in its most harmful form, yet bans or fails to
properly inform consumers of availability of that drug in a much less harmful
form.
' 5 3
45. Id. at 357.
46. Id.
47. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1977.
48. Coral E. Gartner et al., Assessment of Swedish Snus for Tobacco Harm Reduction: An
Epidemiological Modeling Study, 369 LANCET 2010, 2011 (2007).
49. Id. at 2012.
50. Id. at 2012-14. But see Chapman, supra note 20, at 47 ("The potential for [low nitrosamine
smokeless tobacco products] to reduce health risks for [inveterate smokers] needs balancing against any
collateral negative effects of reintroducing smokeless tobacco.").
51. E.g., Gartner et al., supra note 24, at 1138.
52. L.T. Kozlowski & B.Q. Edwards, "Not Safe" is Not Enough: Smokers Have a Right to Know
More Than There is No Safe Tobacco Product, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL (SuPP.), at ii3, ii3 (2005).
53. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1977-78.
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B. The Problem with Snus
"Snus is less dangerous than cigarettes.., but it is very hard to find anything
more dangerous than cigarettes. ,54
Those who oppose promoting snus as a harm-reduction product not only
dispute some of the scientific and epidemiological claims made about snus, but also
dispute the fact that such claims matter from a tobacco control perspective. While
noting that the potential harm of snus, especially American snus, 55 is still uncertain,
and that snus may not have been a significant factor in the Swedish experience of
declining cigarette use, opponents also argue that even if snus did produce a public
health benefit in Sweden, the realities of the U.S. tobacco culture and regulatory
climate necessitate discouraging rather than encouraging snus use in this country.
From a scientific standpoint, those who oppose any promotion of snus argue
that the studies concluding snus is not linked to oral cancer are not reliable and
better studies not funded by smokeless tobacco manufacturers are needed to
evaluate the risks associated with snus. 56 Past studies on the health risks of
smokeless tobacco involve methodological limitations, an inability to estimate
precise risks, and inconsistent findings. 57 Furthermore, no studies have yet been
done to estimate the health risks of the types of snus products being sold in the U.S.
Opponents of snus also emphasize that all smokeless tobacco products deliver
cancer-causing TSNAs and there is no reason to believe that U.S. snus contains the
same TSNA levels as Swedish snus, especially given that Swedish snus exported to
the U.S. has been found to contain higher TSNA levels than snus sold in Sweden.
58
From an epidemiological standpoint, opponents of snus promotion dispute the
claim that snus would be used by smokers to effectively stop smoking and that it
would not be taken up by a significant number of non-tobacco users. 59 Although the
54. Tom Hundley, Snuffing Out Smokes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 2007, at CI (emphasis added)
(quoting Goran Pershagen, Professor Envtl. Hygiene at Stockholm's Karolinska Inst.).
55. See Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S371 ("Products manufactured in Sweden and sold in
the U.S. also show some variability and higher levels of [tobacco-specific N-nitrosamines] than snus
products sold in Sweden.").
56. S.L. Tomar et al., Commentary, Declining Smoking in Sweden: Is Swedish Match Getting the
Credit for Swedish Tobacco Control's Efforts?, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 368, 369 (2003) [hereinafter
Tomar et al., Commentary]. Thus far, many of the studies conducted have been industry funded. Kevin
Helliker, Should Snuff Be Used as a Tool to Quit Smoking?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2006, at Al. In
addition, the relevant research question of whether people who switch from smoking to using snus
reduce their risks for death or disease has not been adequately studied. Scott L. Tomar, Epidemiologic
Perspectives on Smokeless Tobacco Marketing and Population Harm, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED.
(SuPp.), at S387, S389 (2007) [hereinafter Tomar, Epidemiologic Perspectives].
57. Tomar et al., Commentary, supra note 56, at 368 (noting two studies with questionable
methodologies and selective reporting of findings).
58. Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S370-71.
59. News & Views, Smokeless Tobacco: Harm Reduction Debatable, 58 CANCER J. CLINICIANS 4,
4 (2008) ("There is no evidence that smokers will switch to smokeless tobacco products and give up
smoking.") (quoting Michael Thun, M.D., Vice President Epidemiology & Surveillance Res., Am.
2008]
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Swedish experience is referenced as support for these propositions, many experts
are highly critical of the claim that snus was more than a minor cause of Sweden's
success in reducing smoking prevalence. Factors more likely to have produced the
significant decrease in smoking were Sweden's strong public health campaign
discouraging smoking, 60 the significantly lower price of snus compared to
cigarettes, 61 and Sweden's complete ban on tobacco product advertising. 62 In
addition, the data commonly cited to support the notion that Swedes substituted
snus use for smoking do not take into account the substantial proportion of Swedish
men who smoke on less than a daily basis. Although the proportion of daily
smokers in Sweden is low (9.3% of men and 13.3% of women), the proportion of
current smokers remains high (33.4% of men and 30.2% of women). 63 Thus, snus
may have served as a partial substitute for smoking among men, but it has not
significantly contributed to overall cessation.
64
The significant increase in snus use, on the other hand, may have been greatly
influenced by Swedish pop culture and the perception that snus enhances athletic
performance and is not particularly harmful to health.65 Snus use is a major part of
the culture of Sweden's most popular sports, soccer and hockey, and the use of
snus by several high-profile sports stars may have influenced a generation of boys
to use snus. 66 This explanation is consistent with one study's finding that the groups
quitting smoking in Sweden during the 1990s were not the ones taking up snus.
67
The study found that males between the ages of sixteen to twenty-four, the group
most likely to begin daily snus use during that period, were also the group with the
smallest decline in daily smoking.
68
Regardless of what effect snus may have had on smoking and public health in
Sweden, many members of the U.S. tobacco control community are unconvinced
that the Swedish experience should affect their approach to snus because that
experience cannot be replicated in the U.S. First, the regulatory environment in
Cancer Soc'y); Chapman, supra note 20, at 47 ("With youth smoking prevalence at an all-time low...
the industry would be vitally interested in the potential of [low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco products]
to rekindle tobacco use in the group which is its future customer base.").
60. Hundley, supra note 54.
61. B. Rodu et al., Evolving Patterns of Tobacco Use in Northern Sweden, 253 J. INTERNAL MED.
660, 665 (2003).
62. MATT BARRY, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, THE UNITED STATES ISN'T SWEDEN:
WHY UST's EFFORTS TO MAKE COMPARATIVE HEALTH CLAIMS, IN THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF FDA
REGULATION OF ALL TOBACCO PRODUCTS, WON'T WORK AND THREATENS PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (2006),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0283.pdf.
63. Tomar, Epidemiologic Perspectives, supra note 56, at S391.
64. Id.
65. Rodu, supra note 37.
66. Id.
67. Tomar et al., Commentary, supra note 56, at 368.
68. Id.
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Sweden, where the manufacture, shipping, storage, and marketing of snus is highly
regulated, is very different from that in the U.S., where the agencies that regulate
other consumer products currently lack the authority to regulate tobacco. 69 In
addition, the history and culture of cigarette and smokeless tobacco use is different
in the two countries. Sweden has a long history of snus use, and smoking there has
never been as prevalent as it has been historically in the U.S. and other developed
countries.
70
In the U.S., smokeless tobacco was recognized as a major public health
problem in the 1980s, after an extensive marketing campaign by the tobacco
industry succeeded in significantly boosting sales. 71 The public health community
was successful in curbing this trend, and smokeless tobacco use, especially among
adolescents, decreased significantly: just 2.3% of the population used smokeless
tobacco in 2000.72 In light of the positive progress that has been made in reducing
the use of both smokeless tobacco products and cigarettes in the U.S., many public
health experts argue it would be counterproductive to endorse smokeless tobacco
use under any circumstance.
Some experts also argue that rather than providing support for snus as a harm-
reduction measure, the Swedish experience is more accurately citable as an
example of the potential serious adverse effects from the unregulated promotion of
snus. Although Sweden has a long history of snus use, in the 1960s snus was a
dying habit with the average user being an old, poorly educated man from a rural
area.74 Less than 10% of young men and boys used snus.75 However, at that time,
Swedish Tobacco Company launched a massive and unprecedented advertising
campaign in which it introduced new products, updated its packaging, and
succeeded in redefining snus use as a fashionable habit, especially among
sportsmen and athletes. 76 The result was that use of Swedish snus, which had been
declining for fifty years, began to increase sharply, doubling in less than four years.
Snus use among men aged fifteen to nineteen increased from 11% in 1969 to 22%
69. BARRY, supra note 62, at 2. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) lacked authority to promulgate tobacco sales practices regulations. FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126-27 (2000). Cigarettes are specifically
exempted from the following federal laws: Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261(0(2) (2000);
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1459(a)(1) (2000); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(B) (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2602(B)(iii) (2000); and
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2000).
70. Rodu, supra note 37.
71. Nelson et al., supra note 4, at 897.
72. Id. at 899 tbl.1, 901.
73. Id. at 902.
74. Paul Nordgren & Lars Ramstrom, Moist Snuff in Sweden-Tradition and Evolution, 85 BRIT. J.
ADDICTION 1107, 1108 (1990).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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in 1973.77 During that period, snus use among men over age thirty did not change.78
Thus, the Swedish experience provides strong evidence that when aggressively
promoted, snus can be effectively characterized as a fashionable habit among
young men, leading to a sudden increase in use.
Several other factors weaken the argument for promoting snus as a harm-
reduction measure in the U.S. First, the majority of the harm-reduction potential of
snus can only be realized if snus use helps smokers stop smoking; however, it has
not been established that snus is an effective aid to quitting. 79 There is no evidence
that current smokers would find snus to be a suitable substitute for cigarettes, and
unless snus is an acceptable substitute, it is no more likely to help people quit
smoking than any other cessation method. 80 Historically, U.S. smokers do not
become smokeless tobacco users. 8 1 A cigarette is the best nicotine-delivery device
there is, and the notion that U.S. smokers would find snus to be a satisfactory
substitute for smoking is purely conjectural.82
There is cause for concern, however, that rather than being an effective
smoking-cessation tool, snus would actually promote the continued use of
cigarettes. Strong support for this is that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris expect
snus to be used alongside cigarettes and are primarily marketing snus for use in
situations when smokers are not permitted to smoke.83 The significant investment
involved in developing and beginning to market snus was not undertaken by these
companies to appeal to the current market of smokeless tobacco users, which is
small; rather, it was undertaken to respond to the steady decline in smoking rates
and the prevalence of smoking restrictions by providing smokers with the "ability
77. Id. at 1108, 1109 tbl.1.
78. Id. at ll09tbl.l.
79. Martin McKee et al., Correspondence, Swedish Snus for Tobacco Harm Reduction, 370
LANCET 1206, 1206 (2007). But see Lindstrm, supra note 31, at 412, 415 (finding that primarily
Swedish young men successfully used snus as a smoking cessation tool in 2000-2004).
80. See sources cited supra note 59; cf Lindstrm, supra note 31, at 412,415 (finding that women,
middle-aged, and older people in Sweden who successfully quit smoking in 2000-2004 preferred more
traditional nicotine replacement therapy to snus as a cessation aid).
81. BARRY, supra note 62, at 2.
82. Smoking results in the fastest rate of nicotine delivery to the body. Hatsukami et al., supra note
14, at S374. If smokeless tobacco were a suitable substitute for smoking, indoor smoking bans and
health concerns probably would have already resulted in a notable switch from cigarettes to smokeless
tobacco. Lynn T. Kozlowski, Effect of Smokeless Tobacco Product Marketing and Use on Population
Harm from Tobacco Use, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. (Supp,), at S379, S384 (2007).
83. Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S375. Philip Morris is marketing its snus products to appeal
to "adult smokers who are interested in smokeless tobacco alternatives to cigarettes." PhilipMorrisUSA,
Marketing Approach, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/smokeless/ (follow "Marketing Approach"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). R.J. Reynolds is marketing snus using the slogan: "A different
way to enjoy tobacco. Pleasure for wherever!" Snus Camel, http://www.snuscamel.com (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008).
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to enjoy tobacco when they otherwise can't or choose not to smoke." 84 Thus, the
introduction of snus is more likely to increase the dual use of cigarettes and snus
and to provide smokers with fewer reasons to quit rather than give smokers an
additional tool to help them quit.
The second factor that cuts against the argument for promoting snus as a
harm-reduction tool is that the remainder of the reduced-harm potential of snus can
be attained only if non-tobacco users who would have otherwise started smoking
take up snus instead. Given that the use of smokeless tobacco can be a gateway to
cigarette use in the U.S., this result is unlikely. Studies show that using smokeless
tobacco is a risk factor for cigarette smoking as well as other drug addictions, and
that use of smokeless tobacco predicts future cigarette smoking for a number of
American as well as Swedish youth. 85 Indeed, a fundamental risk of addictive drugs
in general is that there is a strong tendency to progress to more aggressive forms of
delivery.86 Many public health experts question how any health care professional
could seriously advocate taking up oral tobacco as a means of preventing smoking
and liken such an approach to "advocating oral opioid narcotics such as codeine as
a means of avoiding heroin use. ' ,87 It does not seem at all farfetched that youth who
started using tobacco in the form of snus would be more willing to try smoking and
get their nicotine fix in that way.
Third, snus is not an appropriate harm-reduction tool because the introduction
of snus in the U.S. is not only unlikely to result in any public health benefit, but
also will likely have a negative effect on public health by attracting new users who
otherwise would not have used any form of tobacco. Such users are most likely to
be young people who decide to experiment with snus because tobacco industry
marketing makes it appear attractive and safe, and because underage consumers can
84. See Conference Call by Reynolds Am., Inc., with Dianne Neal, CFO, Reynolds Am., Inc., in
Winston Salem, N.C. (Oct. 25, 2007), http://seekingalpha.com/article/51448-reynolds-american-q3-
2007-earnings-call-transcript (suggesting a correlation between low cigarette sales volume and the
"pioneering" of spitless tobacco products). R.J. Reynolds's Camel Snus website provides age-verified
visitors with examples of circumstances when they can snus but would not be able to smoke, such as on
an airplane, at a club, or on a ski lift. Snus Camel,
http://www.snuscamel.com/CSN/dtclogin.jsp?brand=CSN (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). The website also
notes that, in addition to being smokeless and spitless, snus leaves a user's hands free so the user can
enjoy other activities, such as dancing and flirting. Id. (follow "Meet Inga" hyperlink; then follow
"Inga's Introduction to Snus" hyperlink).
85. Tomar et al., Commentary, supra note 56, at 368; Henningfield et al., supra note 22, at i5
("Smokeless tobacco use ... is a risk factor for cigarette smoking."). Compare Lindstrdm, supra note
31, at 413 (noting that, although the study at issue was designed to determine the effect of snus use on
smoking cessation, "snus use may have ...an adverse and addictive effect in relation to smoking
initiation.") with H. Furberg et al., Is Swedish Snus Associated with Smoking Initiation or Smoking
Cessation?, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 422, 423 (2005) (finding that snus use among Swedish twins in
study was not associated with smoking initiation).
86. Henningfield et al., supra note 22, at i20.
87. Tomar et al., Commentary, supra note 56, at 369.
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use it discreetly.88 Proponents of snus as a harm-reduction method tend to disregard
this probable effect by noting that a substantial number of people would have to
take up snus for every smoker who switched to snus in order to produce a net harm
to public health.8 9 However, this explanation disregards the overarching goal of
tobacco control-preventing initiation and promoting a continual decline in all
forms of tobacco use90-and suggests a willingness to relinquish much of the
progress the tobacco control movement has made over the past several decades.
The tobacco control community's success in reducing the prevalence of cigarette
and smokeless tobacco use can be attributed to many factors, including: 1) labeling
tobacco use as an aberrant and unpopular behavior (because of the smell, spitting,
etc.), 9' 2) educating people about the serious negative health consequences of
tobacco use,92 3) uncovering the tobacco industry's deceptive and manipulative
practices, 93 and 4) passing laws that limit the places smokers may smoke. 94
Promoting snus as a harm-reduction measure seriously threatens to undermine all
of these successes by: 1) providing a way to use tobacco that is discreet and does
not involve unpopular side effects, 95 2) shifting the focus away from the harm
caused by all forms of tobacco toward the relative "safety" of a particular tobacco
product,96 3) helping the tobacco industry reinvent itself as ostensibly socially
responsible and concerned about consumers, 97 and 4) eliminating the incentive
smoke-free indoor air laws provide for smokers to quit by providing a product that
can be used "wherever., 98 To summarize, the promotion of snus may have serious
unintended consequences that work against many of the factors that have led to
successful tobacco control and thus may add to the tobacco problem rather than
providing a partial solution.99
88. BOONN, supra note 12, at 4.
89. Gartner et al., supra note 48, at 2012-13.
90. Id. at 2010.
91. Ernst L. Wynder, Interrelationship of Smoking to Other Variables and Preventive Approaches,
in 17 RESEARCH ON SMOKING BEHAVIOR 67, 72 (Murray Jarvik et al. eds., Monograph No. 17, 1977).
92. E.g., B.C. MINISTRY OF HEALTH SERVS., BC's TOBACCO CONTROL STRATEGY 4 (2004).
93. See K. Cummings & R. Pollay, Exposing Mr. Butts' Tricks of the Trade, 11 TOBACCO
CONTROL (Supp.), at il (2002).
94. E.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Seeks to Ban Smoking in Every City Restaurant and Bar,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al (noting New York City's efforts to ban smoking in restaurants and
bars, highlighting the laws passed in California and Delaware to ban smoking in virtually every
workplace, and citing statewide bans on smoking in restaurants in Maine, Utah and Vermont).
95. Wendy Koch, As Cigarette Sales Dip, New Products Raise Concerns, USA TODAY, Aug. 7,
2007, at Al.
96. Id.
97. Philip Morris USA, supra note 83; R.J. Reynolds, Our Guiding Principles and Beliefs,
http://www.rjrt.com/values/respCore.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
98. Snus Camel, supra note 83.
99. The alternative view of the Swedish experience as an example of the potential adverse effects
of the unregulated promotion of snus supports the prediction that promoting snus will simply add to the
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Even if snus does increase the chances of successfully quitting cigarette use
for some smokers, it is certainly not a necessary-let alone critical-component of
an overall effective tobacco control program.100 To the contrary, introducing snus
into the mix could undermine tobacco control efforts in states such as California, 
101
Washington,' 0 2 and Oregon, 10 3 each of which has realized great strides in reducing
smoking rates by implementing a range of comprehensive anti-tobacco policies
such as clean indoor air laws;l°4 cigarette tax hikes;10 5 media and counter-marketing
campaigns;' 0 6 broad access to cessation programs, including quit-lines, reduced
tobacco use problem. The U.S. and Norwegian experiences with moist snuff also support this prediction.
See Tomar, Epidemiologic Perspectives, supra note 56, at S395 (noting that the growth in popularity of
moist snuff in the U.S. and Norway simply added to the burden of tobacco use).
100. McKee et al., supra note 79, at 1206.
101. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., Tobacco Control Success Versus Demographic Destiny:
Examining the Causes of the Low Smoking Prevalence in California, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 268, 268
(2008) (noting that California's tobacco control programs resulted in an impressive 33% decrease in
adult smoking prevalence between 1988 and 2005-from 22.8% to 15.2%). For analysis of the
California Tobacco Control Program's impact on adult smoking prevalence, see Karen Messer et al.,
The California Tobacco Control Program's Effect on Adult Smokers: (1) Smoking Cessation, 16
TOBACCO CONTROL 85 (2007); Wael K. AI-Delaimy et al., The California Tobacco Control Program's
Effect on Adult Smokers: (2) Daily Cigarette Consumption Levels, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 91 (2007).
102. From 2001 to 2005, Washington State realized a 4.9% decline in adult smoking prevalence
(from 22.5% to 17.6%), compared to a nationwide decline of 1.8% (22.7% to 20.9%) for the same
period. Julia A. Dilley et al., Effective Tobacco Control in Washington State: A Smart Investment for
Healthy Futures, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Jul. 2007, at 1, 1-3,
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/jul/pdf/06_0109.pdf. A study of Washington State's reduction in
adult and youth smoking prevalence after a decade of stagnation attributed such strides to the
implementation of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy complemented with adequate financial
investment. Id. at 4-6.
103. See News Release, Or. Dep't of Hum. Servs., Oregon Adult, Youth Smoking Drops 41 Percent
in Decade: DHS (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/news/2008news/2008-0201.shtml
(providing the following changes in Oregon tobacco consumption patterns from 1996 to 2006: "22
percent fewer adults smoke; 59 percent fewer 8th graders smoke; 46 percent fewer 11 th graders smoke,
and 30 percent fewer pregnant women smoke. ; and overall cigarette consumption declined 31
percent).
104. California Indoor Clean Air Act of 1976, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 118875, 118885,
118890 (West 2006) (prohibiting smoking in publicly owned buildings and health facilities); Oregon
Indoor Clean Air Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.845-850 (2005) (prohibiting smoking in public places and
employment areas); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.030 (West Supp. 2008) (prohibiting smoking in
public and employment places).
105. See ANN BOONN, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, MAP OF STATE CIGARETTE TAX RATES
(2007), http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0222.pdf; ERIC LINDBLOM & ANN BoONN,
TOBACCO FREE KIDS, STATE CIGARETTE TAX INCREASES SINCE JANUARY 1, 2002 (2007),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0239.pdf (noting that California's cigarette tax is 87
cents per pack, Oregon's tax is $1.18, and Washington's tax is $2.25).
106. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE TOBACCO COUNTER-MARKETING CAMPAIGN 13 (2003)
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/mediacommunications/countermarketing/campaign!00_pdf/cmcchapterl.
pdf; NANCY MUELLER ET AL., THE WASHINGTON PROFILE: A REVIEW OF WASHINGTON'S TOBACCO
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cost services for treatment, 0 7 and public/private health care partnerships; and
school grounds bans and education programs.' 
08
If snus is to be promoted as a nicotine substitute for people trying to quit
smoking, it is unclear what advantages snus would provide over nicotine gum and
patches. 1°9 Medicinal nicotine is certainly less harmful than snus and has been
shown to be an effective aid to quitting; therefore, it should be made more available
and promoted more effectively before the public health community considers
allowing snus into new markets." 0 Many public health experts see an inherent
problem in promoting any type of tobacco use, especially when other options are
available that have yet to be fully utilized.
II. WHAT THE DEBATE MEANS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL IN THE U.S.
The debate comes down to "whether snus should be encouraged as a safer
alternative to smoking, or discouraged as just another harmfully addictive tobacco
product. "'I
The argument for promoting snus as a harm-reduction measure perhaps has
some surface appeal; however, the preceding section reveals its serious flaws.
Because promoting snus as a harm-reduction measure in the U.S. involves at least a
substantial possibility (and more likely a significant probability) of producing a net
harm rather than a net benefit for public health,112 the public health community
should abandon such an approach and continue to focus on reducing access to and
the appeal of tobacco products in general. Such an approach does not, however,
justify withholding relevant health information from consumers, such as the fact
that substituting smokeless products for cigarettes reduces health risks for
individual smokers."l 3 It simply eschews any form of actual promotion of any
tobacco product and focuses on the public health dangers of all tobacco products
rather than their relative benefits.
Such an approach makes sense when considering whom the tobacco control
community is dealing with regarding snus-R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris-the
PREVENTION AND CONTROL PROGRAM JUNE 2002, at 3 (2003), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/context/tc/article/1062/type/pdf/viewcontent/.
107. MATrr BARRY, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO CESSATION WORKS: AN
OVERVIEW OF BEST PRACTICES AND STATE EXPERIENCES 3-4 (2003), available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0245.pdf; Dilley et al., supra note 102, at 3.
108. BARRY, supra note 107; Wash. State Dep't of Health, Preventing Youth from Beginning
Tobacco Use, http://www.doh.wa.gov/tobacco/youth/youth.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
109. Hundley, supra note 54.
110. McKee et al., supra note 79, at 1206; see also infra Part IV.
111. Hundley, supra note 54 (emphasis added).
112. See supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
113. Kozlowski & Edwards, supra note 52.
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two biggest names in "Big Tobacco."' 14 These companies, especially Philip Morris,
have tried to reinvent themselves as more socially responsible and consumer-
friendly than their pasts demonstrate." 5 Although there is no doubt that these
companies are consumer-oriented in the sense that they want to appeal to paying
consumers and will do whatever it takes to do so-whether it be creating reduced-
exposure cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products-there is good reason to be
skeptical about the possibility that Big Tobacco's interests could coincide with
those of the tobacco control community, given the fact that the companies' bottom
lines depend on keeping consumers hooked on harmful tobacco products and
attracting new users. In discussing the introduction of Taboka to the market, the
CEO of Philip Morris remarked: "[W]e are optimistic about our ability to grow our
business by continuing to strengthen our core brands and by complementing this
growth with new revenue and income sources for the future." 116 This goal, while
good for Philip Morris stockholders, is in direct opposition to the goals of the
tobacco control community.
Given the importance of protecting against the serious potential effects snus
may have on public health if allowed to be introduced and marketed on a wide
scale in the U.S., the public health community, in conjunction with lawmakers and
the legal community, must work to effectively and cohesively respond through
measures that will minimize the availability, appeal, and use of snus, particularly
among youth. The most effective method of promoting these goals would be to
enact a complete ban on the sale of snus in the U.S.
A. Enacting a Ban on Snus
"Snus is not a smoking cessation aide, it's a smoking prolongation aide. It's
also a fairly blatant method of recruiting young people to tobacco. 117
A number of countries have placed bans on smokeless tobacco products,
including Australia, New Zealand, and all E.U. countries except Sweden."
8
114. Mike Beime, Big Tobacco Gets Tough - New Tactics After Imposed Marketing Restrictions,
BRANDWEEK, May 14, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOBDW/is_20_42/ai_74699216.
115. P.A. McDaniel & R.E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris's Pursuit of US. Government
Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193, 194 (2005). For more information on Philip
Morris's social responsibility public relations campaign in the early 2000's, see Mitch Zeller, Remarks
at Symposium of "Safer" Tobacco Products: Reducing Harm or Giving False Hope? (Apr. 20, 2007),
(transcript available in the Legal Resource Center for Tobacco Regulation, Litigation & Advocacy,
University of Maryland School of Law).
116. Michael E. Szymanczyk, Chairman & CEO of Philip Morris USA Inc., Remarks at the
Prudential Consumer Conference (Sept. 7, 2006), available at
http://mydiscountcigarette.com/Smokepedia/folder-Nr-24/Remarks-by-Michael-E-Szymanczyk-
Chairman-and-CEO-Philip-Morris-U.245.0.html.
117. Andre Picard, We Need More Tobacco Like a Hole in the Head, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 4, 2007,
at L6 (emphasis added).
118. Chapman, supra note 20, at 47.
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Australia enacted a national ban on the sale of smokeless tobacco products in 1991
to prevent the tobacco industry from building demand for a rarely-used form of
tobacco known to cause cancer. 119 In 1992, the E.U. banned the sale of most
smokeless tobacco products, including snus, to protect public health by preventing
people from starting to use a new tobacco product.120 Currently, pressure from the
tobacco industry as well as harm-reduction proponents to remove these bans is
strong, especially the ban on low-nitrosamine smokeless tobacco products such as
snus. 12 1 E.U. officials, however, say it would be unlikely for any new research to
justify legalizing a substance proven to increase the risk of cancer and
cardiovascular disease. 122 Officials maintain that the focus should be on motivating
smokers to break their nicotine dependence, and allowing snus on the market would
help sustain dependence on tobacco products.1
23
The best approach for the U.S. to take would be to adopt a similar policy and
simply outlaw the sale of snus in this country. This approach would prevent the
probable negative consequences of snus on public health discussed above and
would eliminate the need for tobacco control advocates to fight individual battles
with the tobacco industry in areas such as marketing, sales to minors, flavored
additives, and reduced-harm claims. The biggest advantage of this approach is that
it is consistent with the goal of tobacco control in the long term. Rather than
providing only a short-term harm-reduction strategy with the introduction of snus,
which is likely to backfire, banning snus would eliminate one tobacco problem
before it becomes deep-rooted and would allow the tobacco control community to
continue focusing on existing problems. 124
Regardless of whether using snus is safer than smoking, snus is still a harmful
tobacco product-a type of product Americans do not need more of. As discussed,
this product is extremely unlikely to produce a net public health benefit in the U.S.
because it promotes continuation and initiation of tobacco use, not cessation. 125
Rather than using the Swedish experience to suggest that U.S. smokers will switch
119. Id.
120. Eric Eyre, Smokeless Snus Now Sold in State, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 2007, at IC.
Sweden obtained an exemption from the ban when it joined the E.U. three years later. Id.
121. Chapman, supra note 20, at 47; Rory Watson, BAT Calls for Ban on 'Snus' to be Lifted, TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2007, at 44, available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/consumer-goods/article2577805.ece.
122. Nathalie Vandystadt, EP Wants More Research on Dangers of Snus, EUROPOLITICS, Oct. 26,
2007, at 11, 11.
123. Id.
124. See Ziad Arabi, An Epidemic that Deserves More Attention: Epidemiology, Prevention, and
Treatment of Smokeless Tobacco, 100 S. MED. J. 890, 891 (2007) (explaining that if smokeless tobacco
use replaces smoking in areas where smoking is banned, "the smoking epidemic will simply be replaced
with [a smokeless tobacco] epidemic[,]" defeating one of the purposes of lobbying for smoke-free
environments).
125. See supra Part I.B.
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to snus, which the above discussion has discredited, the Swedish experience can be
cited for the fact that snus has the potential to appeal to a large segment of the
population and produce its own tobacco control crisis. Instead of waiting to see
how and when such a crisis may happen in the U.S., the threat snus presents should
be eliminated by a ban on its sale in the U.S. before-as happened in Sweden126-it
becomes too late. In the U.S., the dramatic health consequences of smoking have
been known for almost 50 years.' 27 Yet because of the prevalence and social
acceptability of smoking and the cultural-though erroneous-notion of a "right"
to smoke, smoking remains a leading public health challenge and effective
regulation of the tobacco industry has yet to be enacted. 128 Rather than allowing the
same sort of pattern to develop with snus, the best step to take is to ban the sale of
snus in the U.S.
Banning snus is not as odd a proposition as it may sound. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for a state to ban a specific type of tobacco product if the legislature
determines that the particular product presents a unique threat to public health or
safety. For example, several states ban the sale of clove cigarettes. 129 Others ban the
sale of bidis, 130 a "cigarette made by rolling tobacco by hand in a dried leaf from
the tendu tree (a member of the ebony family).' 13 1 Most recently, Maine banned the
sale of hard snuff132 and, with some exceptions, flavored cigars and cigarettes. 3 3 At
126. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
127. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006) ("[Olver the
course of more than 50 years, Defendants lied, misrepresented, and deceived the American public...
about the devastating health effects of smoking and environmental tobacco smoke, they suppressed
research, they destroyed documents ... with little, if any, regard for individual illness and suffering...
"1).
128. Michele Tyler, Blowing Smoke: Do Smokers Have a Right? Limiting the Privacy Rights of
Cigarette Smokers, 86 GEO. L.J. 783, 783 (1998) (discussing the right to smoke, second-hand smoke
exposure and the efforts of states to enact smoking regulations); see also Samantha K. Graff, There is
No Constitutional Right to Smoke: 2008, at 5 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://tclconline.org/documents/consitutional-right.pdf (summarizing that there is no Constitutional right
to smoke and that government regulation of tobacco need only be rationally related to a legitimate
government goal).
129. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 859.058 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-106
(LexisNexis 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-2-14 (LexisNexis 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-105.3
(2003).
130. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 685/4-a-5 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-10 (Supp.
2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 § 1003 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9A-9 (LexisNexis 2006) ("The
Legislature finds that young people in this State have been enticed into smoking or using tobacco
products by first using or experimenting with... bidis. Recognizing that the use of bidis is an emerging
public health problem the Legislature hereby adopts a public policy that . . . 'bidis' should not be
imported, sold or distributed .... ").
131. Nat'l Cancer Inst., Dictionary of Cancer Terms,
http://www.cancer.gov/Templates/db-alpha.aspxCdrlD=389458 (last visited Mar. 24, 2008) ("Most
bidis are made in India and they come in different flavors.").
132. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1560-A (Supp. 2007) (.'[H]ard snuff" means a smokeless,
dissolvable tobacco product in lozenge, bit or tablet form that contains as an ingredient compressed,
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least twenty-five states have banned the sale of cigarettes that do not meet certain
fire safety standards.' 34 Therefore, there is nothing preposterous about proposing a
ban on the sale of snus before the product creates a serious public health problem in
the U.S.
Although a complete ban on the sale of snus is the best alternative from a
public health standpoint, reality suggests that it is also an unlikely one. The cultural
notion of a right to smoke may already carry over into a notion of a similar right to
use smokeless tobacco products. In addition, the argument that it is "perverse" to
ban the least harmful forms of an addictive substance, while flawed, has superficial
appeal that is likely to mobilize a significant number of decision makers. Therefore,
it is imperative to consider other ways in which the tobacco control community,
policymakers, and legislators can respond to snus and minimize its adverse effects
on individual and public health.
B. Granting the FDA Authority to Regulate Tobacco
"Every day another 1,200 lives are lost [to tobacco] and more than 1,000
children become regular smokers .... It only makes sense, then, that the FDA-an
agency charged with protecting the health and safety of the public-should be
given regulatory authority over tobacco. 135
Most members of the tobacco control community, recognizing that only so
much can be done to fight Big Tobacco without comprehensive regulation by the
U.S. government, are calling for congressional approval of The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPA), which is concurrently before the
House and Senate. 136 While the legislation is not ideal, and Congress could
powdered tobacco with nicotine, that is intended for human consumption and that is not regulated as a
food or drug or approved as nicotine replacement therapy.").
133. Id. § 1560-D (West Supp. 2007). The exception is made for flavored cigars or cigarettes that
were on the market prior to 1985 for which the Attorney General concludes that the "characterizing
flavor and the associated packaging, promotion and brand style do not directly or indirectly target youth
or encourage the initiation of smoking." Id. § 1560-D.5. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act (FSPA) pending before Congress would prohibit the sale of flavored cigarettes and grant the
FDA power to prohibit or otherwise limit the sale of flavored cigars or smokeless tobacco. H.R. 1108,
110th Cong. §§ 101(b), 907(a)(1) (2007); S. 625, 110th Cong. §§ 101(b), 907(a)(1) (2007). Other states
recently considered legislation to impose bans on various forms of flavored tobacco products. E.g., H.B.
1455, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (introduced in 2007, pending as of Jan. 15, 2008); S.B.
1701, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2007) (referred to Rules Committee as of Dec. 3, 2007); H.B.
2435, 78th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2008) (introduced in House, sent to House Judiciary Committee
as of Jan. 9, 2008).
134. For a comprehensive list of states that have passed fire-safe cigarette legislation, see Coal. for
Fire-Safe Cigarettes, Adoptions, http://www.firesafecigarettes.org (follow "Legislative updates"
hyperlink; then follow "Adoptions" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
135. Editorial, FDA Should Accept Responsibility for Regulating Cigarettes, THE POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 10, 2007, at A12 (emphasis added).
136. Edward M. Kennedy, Letter to the Editor, Regulating Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at
A I8. The two slightly different versions of The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
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certainly do more to advance tobacco control's cause, the proposed legislation is a
step in the right direction, as many public health advocates recognize. 37
Rather than providing the FDA with authority to regulate tobacco as a drug or
drug delivery device under the current provisions of the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),13 8 the proposed legislation creates a new chapter within the
FDCA under which tobacco products will be regulated. 139 This somewhat avoids
the incongruence of FDA approval of an inherently dangerous product within a
scheme designed to allow the sale of foods and of drugs that treat or cure illness
and disease. The proposed legislation does not limit the Federal Trade
Commission's (FTC) authority over the advertising and sale of tobacco products,
but violations of the FSPA will also be considered unfair or deceptive practices
under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). 140 The FSPA would grant the
FDA, acting through the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the
Secretary"), authority over a wide array of issues relating to the manufacture and
sale of tobacco products. 141 Much of that authority, should the legislation pass,
could be exercised to respond effectively to the introduction of snus.
First, the proposed legislation would require premarket review and approval
by the FDA before any new tobacco product could be introduced. 42 Under the
House version of the FSPA, a "new tobacco product" is one that was not
commercially marketed in the U.S. as of February 15, 2007, and is not
"substantially equivalent" to an existing product, as delineated in the FSPA. 143
Because Taboka and Camel Snus were only test-marketed and not commercially
marketed as of February 15, 2007, these products would qualify as "new" under the
FSPA. 144 Therefore, in accordance with this provision, Philip Morris and R.J.
Reynolds would need to submit applications to the FDA containing information
currently being considered by the House and Senate are H.R. 1108, which was approved by the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce on April 2, 2008, and S. 625, which was approved by the Senate
Heath, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee on August 1, 2007. News Release, Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, Energy and Commerce Committee Approves Landmark Tobacco Bill (Apr. 2,
2008), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/110nr244.shtml; Diedtra Henderson, FDA Might
Get Regulatory Power Over Tobacco, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2007, at A2.
137. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, FDA Authority Over Tobacco,
http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
138. 21 U.S.C. §§ 310-399 (2000).
139. H.R. 1108 § 101; S. 625 § 101.
140. H.R. 1108 § 914; S. 625 § 914; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce as set forth under the Federal Trade Commission Act).
141. H.R. 1108 §§ 101(b), 901; S. 625 §§ 101(b), 901.
142. H.R. 1108 § 910(a); S. 625 § 910(a).
143. H.R. 1108 §§ 910(a)(1), 910(a)(2)(B) (as reported by S. Comm. on Health, March 11, 2008).
The Senate version sets June 1,2003, as the cutoff date. S. 625 §§ 910(a)(l), 910(a)(2)(B).
144. See H.R. 1108 § 910(a)(1)(A). Premarket approval would also apply to Marlboro Snus and
Grand Prix snus because both products were introduced after February 15, 2007, and only in test-
markets. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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about their products' ingredients and manufacturing methods, as well as all
information the companies have about the products' health risks. 45 The FDA may
deny product approval if the agency determines that there is "a lack of a showing
that permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the
protection of the public health," and this determination must be made in light of the
"risks and benefits to the population as a whole." 146 At an applicant's request or the
Secretary's discretion, the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee
("Advisory Committee"), established by the FSPA and composed mostly of
members of the medical community, will recommend whether the product should
be approved before the Secretary makes his or her decision. 1
47
This process would keep alive the possibility of keeping snus off the market,
if the Advisory Committee recommended denying the application and the Secretary
agreed. Achieving such a result would likely be an uphill battle, however, for the
same reasons that an overall ban on snus is very unlikely. Nevertheless, given the
potential serious adverse effects on public health from the introduction of snus
discussed above, an applicant may be unable to show that permitting the product to
be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of public health. At the very
least, through the pre-market approval process the FDA could ensure that any new
snus products marketed are no less safe than the least harmful forms of Swedish
snus.
Another important provision in the proposed legislation would require FDA
approval before any tobacco product could be marketed as a "modified risk"
product.1 48 A modified risk product includes any product that through labeling,
advertising, or actions through the media states or implies that there is a reduced
risk of harm or reduced exposure to a substance associated with its use. 149 Although
R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris have thus far not made any reduced-risk claims in
marketing their snus products, it has been suggested that Philip Morris supports
passage of the FDA bill precisely so it may do so.1
50
In approving an application to market a product as reduced risk, the FDA
must find that the product, as actually used by consumers, will benefit the health of
the population as a whole.' 5' This provision is key in ensuring that the "light" and
145. H.R. 1108 § 910(b); S. 625 § 910(b).
146. H.R. 1108 §§ 910(c)(2)(A), 910(c)(4); S. 625 §§ 910(c)(2)(A), 910(c)(4).
147. H.R. 1108 §§ 910(b)(2), 918(a)-(b); S. 625 §§ 910(b)(2), 918(a)-(b).
148. H.R. 1108 §§ 91 1(a); S. 625 § 91 l(a).
149. H.R. 1108 § 911(b); S. 625 § 911 (b). Significantly, this definition includes use of the words
"light," "mild," or "low," and therefore would rid the market of the infamous "Marlboro Lights" and
other such products (unless they obtained FDA approval). H.R. 1108, § 911(b)(2)(A)(ii); S. 625 §
91 l(b)(2)(A)(ii). See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
150. Mike Beime, Ahead of the Curve? Philip Morris Trying New Avenues, BRANDWEEK, Oct. 29,
2007, http://www.brandweek.com/bw/news/packaged/article-display.jspvnu-content_id= 003664845.
151. H.R. 1108 § 91 l(g)(1)(B); S. 625 § 91 l(g)(1)(B).
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"low-tar" cigarette disaster is not repeated. 5 2 It requires a tobacco manufacturer,
through scientific evidence, to demonstrate that its product will produce an overall
health benefit, and provides special rules for allowing reduced exposure claims
where conclusive evidence of reduced risk is not yet available. 53 Thus, this
requirement could be used to effectively ensure that whatever health claims snus
manufacturers make will not be false or misleading, but are estimated to be
appropriate for the protection of public health. This provision could also ensure that
manufacturers do not refer to the Swedish experience when marketing their
products unless they have established that their products contain a similar potential
to reduce individual health risks.
Several other provisions of the FSPA are significant. One provision grants the
FDA authority to restrict the sale and advertising of a tobacco product to the full
extent permitted by the First Amendment if the Secretary determines it would be
appropriate for the protection of public health. 15 4 This is a "catchall" provision that
could be used to help ensure that manufacturers do not market snus in a way likely
to appeal to youth or to reduce smoking cessation. 55 Other provisions in the FSPA
amend the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) 156 and the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act (CSTHEA)"' to require
new warning labels on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products and increase the
size of the warnings in proportion to their packaging.158 Related sections of the
FSPA grant the FDA authority to revise the required warning labels to a certain
extent, such as by requiring color graphics accompanying the text, if it would
promote greater public understanding of the risks associated with product use.' 5
9
152. "Light," "ultra light," "low tar," and similarly described cigarettes were initially manufactured
and marketed in response to concerns about tar being one of the primary constituents responsible for the
negative health consequences of smoking. See Amy Fairchild & James Colgrove, Out of the Ashes: The
Life, Death, and Rehirth of the 'Safer' Cigarette in the United States, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 192, 193
(2004). However, these cigarettes proved no less dangerous than their conventional counterparts. As a
result, smokers who switched to light cigarettes instead of quitting altogether actually suffered greater
harm. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
153. H.R. 1108 § 911 (g)(2)-(4); S. 625 § 911 (g)(2)-(4).
154. H.R. 1108 § 906(d)(1); S. 625 § 906(d)(1).
155. Current snus marketing in the U.S. is aimed at smokers and encourages using snus as a
complement to cigarette use. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Because such use would be
unlikely to produce a public health benefit, presumably such marketing could be regulated or proscribed
to the extent permitted by the First Amendment.
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (2000).
158. H.R. 1108 §§ 201, 204, 906(d)(1); S. 625 §§ 201, 204, 906(d)(1). The new warnings must
occupy at least 30% of the front and rear panels of the package and 20% of any related advertisements.
H.R. 1108 §§ 201(2)(A), 204(b)(2)(A); S. 625 §§ 201(2)(A), 204(b)(2)(A).
159. H.R. 1108 §§ 202, 205; S. 625 §§ 202, 205.
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Using these provisions to indeed require graphic warning labels could help
discourage youth from using all tobacco products-snus included. 1
60
Finally, another provision in the proposed legislation mandates that cigarettes
not contain any kind of flavoring other than tobacco, menthol, or herbs and spices,
and specifically lists a variety of fruit and candy flavors that are prohibited. 61 This
rule does not apply to smokeless products; however, the FDA may adopt other
tobacco product standards that the Secretary finds are appropriate for the protection
of public health. 162 It has been recognized that tobacco manufacturers use fruit and
candy flavorings in their products primarily as a way to appeal to youth; in fact,
internal tobacco company documents state that new smokeless tobacco users (who
are likely to be under eighteen years of age) often start by using products that are
milder tasting and more flavored. 163 Therefore, while it would be preferable for the
FSPA to explicitly exclude smokeless tobacco manufacturers from using such
flavors, this provision at least allows for the possibility that the Secretary would
promulgate such a restriction in the future. 64
Although congressional approval of the FSPA in its current form would be a
huge step for tobacco control, the proposed legislation nevertheless has
shortcomings that cast doubt on how effective it would be in protecting the public
health from the harms of tobacco use. To be effective, a bill must do more than
160. Maansi A. Bansal et al., Do Smokers Want to Know More about the Cigarettes They Smoke?
Results from the EDUCATE Study, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. (SuPP.) 289, 300 (2004) ("[E]vidence
is now emerging that graphic health warnings . . . are more effective than text-based warnings....
[because] ... viewers [can] imagine the disease more easily ... [and] perceive the health threat as more
likely.") (citation omitted)); E.J. Strahan et al., Enhancing the Effectiveness of Tobacco Package
Warning Labels: A Social Psychological Perspective, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 183, 188 fig.5 (2002)
(outlining tobacco packaging strategies for enhancing effectiveness of warning labels).
161. H.R. 1108 § 907(a)(1); S. 625 § 907(a)(1).
162. H.R. 1108 § 907(a)(3); S. 625 § 907(a)(3).
163. BOONN, supra note 12, at 2-3; accord Carrie M. Carpenter et al., New Cigarette Brands with
Flavors that Appeal to Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1601, 1603-05 (2005)
(reviewing industry research on flavored cigarettes); M. Jane Lewis & Olivia Wackowski, Dealing with
an Innovative Industry: A Look at Flavored Cigarettes Promoted by Mainstream Brands, 96 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 244, 244 (2006) (discussing tobacco industry flavor innovations); Carmen Phillips, Young
Adults and Flavored Cigarettes: A Bad Combination, NCI CANCER BULL., Mar. 14, 2006, at 3, 3,
available at http://www.cancer.gov/NCICancerBulletin/NCICancer Bulletin_031406.pdf (discussing
tactics used to lure younger adults to smoking). An illustrative Lorillard Tobacco Company
memorandum explained that "Tutti Frutti" flavored cigarettes were described as "for younger people,
beginner cigarette smokers, teenagers . . . when you feel like a light smoke, want to be reminded of
bubblegum." R.M. MANKO ASSOCS., SUMMARY REPORT NEW FLAVORS FOCUS GROUP SESSIONS 17
(1978), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/lor/85093450-3480.html?pattem=85093450-
3480#images (presenting focus group research data to Lorillard Tobacco Company regarding Lorillard's
new tobacco products and flavors).
164. As currently marketed, however, this provision would be unlikely to affect the current offering
of Camel Snus products, which come in frost, spice, and original, or Marlboro Snus products, which are
manufactured with rich, mild, mint, and spice. Camel Snus, supra note 1; Philip Morris USA, supra note
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create "FDA-approved" traditional tobacco products.' 65 One criticism of FDA
regulation of tobacco in general is that it would provide an impenetrable litigation
shield for the tobacco industry.166 Although the FSPA contains a provision stating
that it should not be read to modify any type of state law liability, 167 an FDA "seal
of approval" on tobacco products could nevertheless affect jury decisions and be
used to defend against high punitive damage awards in product liability lawsuits. 
68
FDA regulation of tobacco could also be used as an effective litigation shield,
and an effective public relations tool in general, by companies such as Philip
Morris who support the legislation. Indeed, Philip Morris's support of the proposed
legislation has been cited as one of the FSPA's major flaws. 69 The company's
open support for the legislation is explained by its desire to gain legitimacy through
image enhancement; Philip Morris's polling data found that the percentage of
adults with an unfavorable image of the company was substantially reduced with
knowledge that the company supported FDA regulation.170 Besides the company's
desire to redefine itself as socially responsible, Philip Morris probably regarded
some form of regulation as inevitable, and thus decided to work to ensure that such
regulation was as favorable as possible as well as to alter its practices to comply
with such regulation now so as to gain an early advantage over its competitors. 171
Another criticism of the proposed legislation is its clear preemption of state
and local tobacco regulations. 172 The FSPA contains provisions explaining in what
areas the states are preempted from regulating and amending the FCLAA's
preemption section. 173 According to these provisions, states are preempted from
passing regulations involving tobacco product standards, pre-market approval,
labeling, and advertising content, among other things, but are not preempted from
passing time, place, and manner restrictions on advertising, even if based on
smoking and health. 174 The Act does not amend CSTHEA preemption; however,
that Act has a narrower preemption provision than the FCLAA. 17 A better
approach from a tobacco control standpoint would be to enact a bill with no federal
165. Kozlowski et al., supra note 21, at 372.
166. Michael Givel, Commentary, FDA Legislation, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 217, 217 (2007).
167. H.R. 1108§917; S. 625 §917.
168. Givel, supra note 166, at 217; see also Christopher Banthin & Richard Daynard, Room for Two
in Tobacco Control: Limits on the Preemptive Scope of the Proposed Legislation Granting FDA
Oversight of Tobacco, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (2008).
169. Cheerios Are Regulated-Why Not Cigarettes?, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2007, at 10A.
170. McDaniel & Malone, supra note 115, at 194.
171. Id.
172. Givel, supra note 166, at 217.
173. H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. §§ 917, 203 (2007); S. 625, 110th Cong. §§ 917, 203 (2007).
174. H.R. 1108 § 203; S. 625 § 203.
175. Micah Berman, Tobacco Litigation Without the Smoke?, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 7, 26
n. 114 (2008).
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preemption of advertising restrictions; however, preemption of tobacco product
standards and pre-market approval regulations is probably necessary.
Despite the FSPA's shortcomings and its backing from Philip Morris, the best
option for controlling tobacco in general and responding to snus in particular is to
pass the proposed legislation because the current alternative is to do nothing. The
Act nearly passed in 2004,176 and now, four years later, a major federal agency
charged with protecting the public health still lacks authority to regulate a product
that is one of the leading causes of death among Americans. 177 In the absence of
regulation, any smokeless tobacco product can be called "snus. '178 If nothing
prevents snus from being introduced across America-as will likely happen
sometime in 2008-then, at a minimum, there must be regulation in place that can
ensure that no false health claims are made about snus, and that snus is not
marketed to youth.
C. Using Public Health Strategies at the State Level
"Increasing smokeless tobacco excise taxes, mass media countermarketing
campaigns, school-based and other educational efforts, and prevention and
cessation counseling . . . are necessary to sustain the declining use of both
smokeless tobacco and cigarettes. ,179
Whether or not the bill granting the FDA authority to regulate tobacco is
ultimately passed, state public health officials must use other means to respond to
Big Tobacco's introduction and marketing of snus. Price, advertising, and public
health messages all significantly influence behavior,1 80 and public health officials
must control these factors as they relate to snus to prevent snus from causing the
next crisis in tobacco control and undermining the progress that has already been
achieved.
First, the tobacco control community should work with legislators to pass
appropriate excise taxes on snus. Increasing the price of a tobacco product through
an excise tax can help reduce the amount consumed by current users as well as
discourage initiation, and such effects are particularly pronounced among young
people. 181 For a tax on snus to have the desired effect, however, manufacturers
must not be able to avoid the effect of a price increase by offering more frequent
176. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 137.
177. Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 JAMA 1238,
1239-40 (2004).
178. BOONN, supra note 12, at 1.
179. Nelson et al., supra note 4, at 903 (emphasis added).
180. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1977.
181. Henningfield et al., supra note 22, at i19.
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deals, such as buy one/get one free. 182 Manufacturer discounts and free sample
offers for potentially reduced-exposure cigarettes such as Eclipse® played a key
role in encouraging new users to try those products,' 83 and similar promotions may
also have a significant effect on who decides to try snus. Already, R.J. Reynolds
has begun offering a free tin of Camel Snus with the purchase of a tobacco product
in test-market cities and snus coupons have been distributed to college students. 84
Because these kinds of promotions have the potential to vastly increase the number
of people willing to try snus, state officials must act quickly to pass legislation that
effectively eliminates such promotions.1
85
Second, the tobacco control community should work to send a consistent
public health message regarding snus at both the national and the state level.
Although the new snus products are still in the test-market stage, 186 more and more
tobacco and non-tobacco users across the nation are learning about snus as news
sources frequently weigh in on the potential harms and benefits. As Philip Morris
and R.J. Reynolds expand their marketing of snus, potential consumers will be
presented with sleek and effective marketing strategies to pique their interest. R.J.
Reynolds executives realize the importance of consumer education in determining
the success of snus, and want to be sure to "do it right."' 87 Thus, public health
officials must make sure that these messages are not the only ones that youth and
the rest of the public receive. The tobacco control community must get out the
message that snus is addictive and unsafe. Rather than presenting snus as a
completely different product from cigarettes or other forms of smokeless tobacco, it
may be effective to link the products together and thus make use of the current
message that tobacco use is an aberrant social behavior. As part of the public health
campaign, tobacco control advocates must be careful not to allow snus to be
perceived as "in" and not particularly harmful, so that youth, including athletes
concerned about their health, will not be interested in and willing to try it.
Third, states can make use of MSA provisions to restrict the way in which
R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris market their new snus products. This approach is
vital because as long as these two companies remain in control of marketing snus,
182. Sadly, even price-sensitive consumers will purchase costly tobacco products if they have
developed an addiction, which is what tobacco companies hope to achieve with freebies or deep
discount-coupons. See Thomas D. MacKenzie et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use, 330 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 975, 976 (1994) (demonstrating that tobacco companies use promotional expenditures to
increase consumption through tactics such as distributing free cigarettes).
183. R.S. Caraballo et al., New Tobacco Products: Do Smokers Like Them?, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL
39, 41 (2006).
184. R.J. Reynolds Expands Snus Tests, supra note 17; Eyre, supra note 120, at IC.
185. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 118950(a)(10)(b)-(c)(l) (West Supp. 2008)
(prohibiting the use of gift certificates, gift cards, and similar offers when used in the distribution of free
tobacco products as of Jan. 1, 2008).
186. E.g., Vanessa O'Connell, Marlboro Brand Goes Smokeless, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at A3.
187. Conference Call by Reynolds Am., Inc., supra note 84.
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the introduction of snus is certain to have a negative effect on public health as the
companies promote the dual (use of cigarettes and snus and seek to expand their
consumer base.'88 MSA provisions that restrict the promotion of "tobacco
products" apply to the marketing of these new snus products because the MSA
definition of "tobacco products" includes both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco,
and the snus manufacturers, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, are parties to the
MSA. I8 9 Relevant MSA provisions include the prohibition of youth targeting in
tobacco product advertising, the ban on youth access to free samples, and the
prohibition of material misrepresentations regarding the health consequences of
tobacco products. 190 The youth-targeting prohibition is particularly important. R.J.
Reynolds was judicially found to have violated the MSA through its advertising of
Camel cigarettes in magazines having substantial teen readership. 191 Another case
resulted in a settlement between state Attorneys General and R.J. Reynolds in
which Reynolds agreed to stop marketing a long list of flavored cigarette
products. 192 If Reynolds or Philip Morris were to return to their old (or not-so-old)
marketing ways in promoting snus, an action by state Attorneys General to enforce
the provisions of the MSA may be successful in stopping them. At the very least,
such a lawsuit would bring the companies' youth-targeting practices to the public's
attention. 193
Fourth, state Attorneys General can also make use of state consumer
protection laws to ensure that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris do not make any
false or misleading statements with regard to the relative safety of snus. Under
consumer protection laws, state Attorneys General may seek an injunction against
an entity that has committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice and prohibit the
188. Berman, supra note 175, at 47; see also Chapman, supra note 20, at 48 ("The tobacco industry
has shown itself to be resourceful, rapacious and duplicitous in . . . sales maximisation [sic], and any
notion that they would be disinterested in the youth market, in providing nicotine substitutes for
smoking 'downtime,' and in preventing smokers from abandoning tobacco use altogether is naYve.").
189. Berman, supra note 175, at 20-21. Of course, manufacturers not subject to the MSA could not
be held to this standard.
190. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Master Settlement Agreement §§ HI(a), (g), (r) (1998), available at
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ (follow "Master Settlement Agreement"
hyperlink).
191. People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. GIC 764118, 15-18 (Super. Ct. San
Diego County June 6, 2002), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms02/02-067-rjadl .pdf
(Statement of Decision ordering R.J. Reynolds to pay $20 million in sanctions and to comply with the
MSA's prohibitions against youth targeting in print advertising).
192. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Attorney's General and R.J. Reynolds Historic
Settlement to End the Sale of Favored Cigarettes (Oct. 11, 2006),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/oct/octl la_06.html. A copy of the Settlement Agreement is
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/oct/flavored%20settlement.final.pdf.
193. Berman, supra note 175, at 22-25.
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entity from making any false or misleading statements in the future.194 An
actionable unfair or deceptive act may include statements that are express or
implied, oral or written. 95 Thus, if any of the companies' statements imply that use
of snus involves little risk of harm or involves less harm than other forms of
tobacco use, states should investigate whether the companies have actual scientific
evidence to support those claims.
As discussed above, the public health community has very little information
about the health effects of Camel Snus, Marlboro Snus, or Taboka because the
products are so new. 196 It is not clear how these products compare to Swedish snus
in terms of TSNA and nicotine levels, and the products' long-term health effects
also remain unknown. 19 7 However, it is clear that snus is not a safe product, 198 and
to the extent that tobacco companies imply that it is relatively safe without reliable
information to substantiate that claim, they are misleading consumers. The outcome
of such a claim is not certain to be favorable; however, given the broad purpose of
state consumer protection statutes of protecting consumers from injury, a judge
could certainly conclude that making implied claims of health benefits without
reliable evidence violates such statutes.' 
99
D. Focus on Improving Alternative Sources of "Clean" Nicotine
"Our lack of greater progress in tobacco control is more the result offailure
to implement proven strategies than it is the lack of knowledge about what to
do. 200
The concept of the public health community promoting an alternative form of
nicotine delivery-smokeless tobacco or snus-to decrease smoking raises the
question of why such products should be promoted over products that deliver
194. E.g., Consumer Protection Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-301, 13-406 (West 2002).
State consumer protection laws are modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (2000).
195. James C. Miller III, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC Policy Statement on
Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (defining the
FTC's policy on deceptive acts to include "false oral or written representations").
196. See supra Part I.B.
197. Id.
198. Foulds & Kozlowski, supra note 15, at 1977.
199. Several state Attorneys General, led by Vermont's and including Maryland's, have sued R.J.
Reynolds under Vermont's consumer protection statute and the MSA claiming that Reynolds has made
false and misleading statements regarding the health consequences of using Eclipseg, a potentially
reduced-risk cigarette product. Pet. for Contempt & Compl., Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Nos. 744-97 CnC & S-816-98, at 1 (Super. Ct. Chittenden County filed July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/1125510625 Vermonts Complaint and Petition.pdf.
200. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2000 Surgeon
General's Report-Reducing Tobacco Use (quoting David Satcher, Surgeon Gen.),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/sgr_2000/sgrtobacco-aag.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2008).
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nicotine "cleanly," that is, without the tobacco and other toxic additives. 2°' While
harm-reduction advocates support the message that smokeless tobacco is a "safer"
alternative to cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products still deliver many known
carcinogens and cannot be classified as safe as can NRT, or medicinal nicotine.20 2
Encouraging NRT over smokeless tobacco not only eliminates health risks, but
avoids the possibility of negating the gains the tobacco control movement has made
in reducing smoking prevalence should these same advocates begin promoting
smokeless tobacco use that could possibly progress to smoking.2 3 Those who
support using snus as a public health tool must therefore be able to articulate what
justifies its promotion as a smoking cessation product over NRT.
III. SMOKELESS TOBACCO IS NOT AN INHERENTLY BETTER CIGARETTE
SUBSTITUTE THAN NRT
The primary justification offered for advocating snus or other smokeless
tobacco products over NRT is that smokeless tobacco is likely to be more appealing
to smokers and thus more likely to be used as a substitute for cigarettes.20 4 This
argument should be given serious consideration because a cigarette substitute can
only be effective in reducing tobacco-related harm if smokers actually use it. The
argument also highlights a key difference between smokeless tobacco and NRT:
smokeless tobacco has been formulated to create and sustain addiction, while NRT
has been formulated for smoking cessation and not for long-term use. 205 Thus,
smokeless tobacco may be a better substitute because it feeds, rather than helps
break, the nicotine addiction and tobacco-use habit. However, the addictiveness of
smokeless tobacco, including snus, does not answer why smokeless tobacco is a
more appealing alternative to NRT. Seventy percent of current adult smokers want
201. McKee et al., supra note 79, at 1206. Many people erroneously believe that nicotine is the
harmful, cancer-causing substance in tobacco products. Saul Shiffman et al., Smokers' Preferences for
Medicinal Nicotine vs. Smokeless Tobacco, 31 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAv. 462, 469 (2007).
202. Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 462-63. Although some evidence points to possible disease
risk from nicotine, NRT has been judged safe to use, even in the long-term. Lynn T. Kozlowski et al.,
Advice on Using Over-the-Counter Nicotine Replacement Therapy-Patch, Gum, or Lozenge-to Quit
Smoking, 32 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORs 2140, 2142 (2007); Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 462.
203. See Shiffinan et al., supra note 201, at 469 (comparing medicinal nicotine to smokeless tobacco
and noting that smokeless tobacco raises concerns about progression to smoking). Unlike smokeless
tobacco, there is no real concern that nonsmokers would respond to promotions of NRT as a smoking
cessation tool by taking up NRT and then progressing to smoking, Although it has been suggested that
NRT could possibly promote continued smoking by smokers who use it to help satisfy their cravings in
smoke-free environments (similar to smokeless tobacco), there are no data supporting this as a public
health problem. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2143. In fact, several countries have already
accepted such use as an approved indication for NRT. Id.
204. Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 463.
205. Id. at 470.
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to quit smoking, and there is no reason to think they want to quit simply so they can
become addicted to another form of tobacco.2 °6
The argument of smokeless tobacco proponents rests on the assumption that
current smokers do not mind being addicted to nicotine so much as they mind the
health consequences of their addiction, and that if presented with a persuasive case
to switch to a less harmful but still somewhat risky tobacco product, many would
207rather do so than switch to a clean form of nicotine. However, this assumption is
unwarranted for several reasons. First, as previously mentioned, smokeless tobacco
use is not a good substitute for smoking when it comes to satisfying one's need for
208nicotine. Smoking is the best form of nicotine delivery because breathing in
smoke through the lungs gives the brain a "rush" of nicotine.20 9 Smokeless tobacco
delivers nicotine more slowly.210 In addition, smoking is a distinctive behavior that
use of smokeless tobacco products does not replicate; this may also make
smokeless tobacco a poor substitute. NRT is also a far from perfect substitute for
smoking. However, other than the fact that it does not contain tobacco or the
tobacco taste, there is no reason that a medicinal nicotine product could not be
formulated to deliver nicotine as effectively as a smokeless tobacco product such as
snus.
Second, this assumption is undermined by a study that sought to compare
current smokers' interest in smokeless tobacco versus medicinal nicotine as a
substitute for smoking and found that smokers expressed a "robust preference" for
NRT over smokeless tobacco.211 The smokers were informed of the relative risks of
206. C. Tracy Orleans, Increasing the Demand for and Use of Effective Smoking-Cessation
Treatments, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S340, S341 (Supp. 2007). Many NRT products come in
varying levels of nicotine to allow a downward step-by-step progression toward a nicotine-free life.
MARTIN RAW ET AL., ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, NICOTINE REPLACEMENT THERAPY 3 (2005),
available at http://whyquit.com/NRT/NRTGuidance UK 1205.pdf. Snus or other smokeless tobacco
products do not offer such benefits.
207. See Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 469 (noting that smokeless tobacco proponents have
argued for promoting smokeless tobacco products over medicinal nicotine based on the expectation that
current smokers would prefer smokeless tobacco products).
208. Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S374.
209. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2146. The speed at which a product delivers nicotine to the
body depends on the product pH, nicotine content, and route of administration, with cigarette smoking
providing the fastest mode of delivery. Hatsukami et al., supra note 14, at S374.
210. The speed of nicotine delivery of smokeless tobacco products varies depending on the amount
of free-nicotine (determined by nicotine content and pH level) in a specific product. Hatsukami et al.,
supra note 14, at S374-75. Free-nicotine levels vary widely among different smokeless tobacco
products and have not yet been studied in the newer products. Id. at S375.
211. Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 469. In the study, current smokers were presented with two
sets of alternatives between smoke-free tobacco and tobacco-free nicotine. The first set of alternatives
presented were "prototypical" forms -nicotine gym and smokeless tobacco. Id. at 463. The second set
of alternatives presented were relatively novel forms -a lozenge for both NRT and smokeless tobacco.
Id. In both cases, smokers expressed a preference for medicinal nicotine over smokeless tobacco,
although the preference for medicinal nicotine was greater in the first set of alternatives. Id. at 469.
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smoking and smokeless tobacco and still preferred the non-tobacco form of
nicotine, suggesting that lack of information about relative risks is not the only
barrier to the appeal of smokeless tobacco.212
IV. NRT PRODUCTS AND THEIR USE MUST EVOLVE TO OFFER A MORE EFFECTIVE
CIGARETTE SUBSTITUTE
Numerous studies and clinical trials have established NRT as an effective
smoking cessation aid.21 3 Various forms of NRT are available: the patch, gum, and
lozenge are available over the counter; and oral inhalers, nasal spray, and non-
nicotine medications in tablet form are available by prescription.2 4 Overall, the
products have similar efficacy and have been shown to double the odds of
successfully quitting. 2 15 But despite the development and increased accessibility of
effective NRT, the national annual quit rate has not changed much over the past
twenty years.21 6 Although 70% of current U.S. adult smokers say they want to quit,
only 40% make a serious attempt each year, and only 15% to 20% of those who
217attempt to quit use NRT. Thus, much of the potential of NRT to help smokers
quit and reduce population smoking rates is not being realized. The public health
community must work together with national and state governments to address the
issues that are hindering the potential effectiveness of NRT.
One of the current problems with NRT is that many smokers do not believe it
is effective,21 8 and if used in the way currently recommended by the manufacturers,
NRT actually may not be effective for many smokers. Currently, NRT labels
recommend use for just eight to twelve weeks. 219 However, smokers should know
that using NRT for longer periods is not dangerous; going back to smoking is
dangerous. 220 In addition, smokers not succeeding with standard recommended
usage of one form of NRT should be encouraged to use a higher dose of NRT or to
use more than one type of NRT at the same time-whatever will safely keep them
from smoking. 221 For example, one safe and effective option to help prevent a
212. Id. at 469. The result would not necessarily be the same if the study were conducted with snus;
however, the study suggests that current smokers may prefer to substitute cigarette use with use of a
non-tobacco product, medicinal nicotine, rather than another tobacco product such as snus. See id.
213. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2141.
214. Id. at 2144-45.
215. Susan Thomas, Smoking Cessation Part 2: Nicotine Replacement Therapy, NURSING
STANDARD, Oct. 10, 2007 44, 44.
216. Orleans, supra note 206, at S341.
217. Id.; Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 463.
218. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2141.
219. Id. at 2146.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2146-47. The public health community can help by communicating to smokers that NRT
is an effective smoking cessation aid and that if NRT has not worked for them in the past, there are other
ways to safely use NRT that may be more effective. Id. at 2147.
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smoking relapse is to use nicotine gum or a lozenge in addition to the patch at a
time when it is especially hard to keep from smoking, but many smokers do not
realize this.
222
Another problem with NRT is that the stark regulatory disparity between
cigarettes and NRT may lead smokers to believe NRT is more dangerous than it
actually is. 223 NRT is regulated to ensure that it meets quality and safety standards,
yet the extensive health warnings and instructions it contains may give some
smokers a false sense of risk; by contrast, cigarettes are unregulated and their
packages contain only a brief health warning.224 A false sense of risk regarding
NRT is also a result of many smokers' inaccurate belief that nicotine (instead of
tobacco) is the toxic agent in cigarettes. 2 5 Correcting such misperceptions is a
crucial step in advancing the effectiveness of NRT as a smoking cessation aid
population-wide.
Also hindering the successful use of NRT is its cost. NRT costs significantly
more than cigarettes and is not available in small quantities, two factors that may
dampen its appeal to or even prohibit its use by smokers, especially those of lower
socio-economic status-the same demographic who are most likely to smoke.226
Fortunately, cost is one factor that can be modified to reduce the burden on
smokers attempting to quit using NRT, and reducing cost has been shown to lead to
increased utilization. For example, in 1999 the United Kingdom began a
comprehensive effort to expand the utilization of NRT to treat tobacco dependence,
which included making all NRT products reimbursable.227 This policy succeeded in
increasing the total use of NRT 28 Advocates of such a strategy point out that just
as higher cigarette taxes and prices have been shown to discourage tobacco use,
NRT use can be encouraged by making it less expensive. 229 Some state and private
insurers in the U.S. have begun to assist smokers with paying for NRT, and such
programs have significant potential to increase the number of successful quitters. 3 °
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2142.
224. Id.
225. Shiffman et al., supra note 201.
226. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2142-43.
227. R. West et al., Impact of UK Policy Initiatives on Use of Medicines to Aid Smoking Cessation,
14 TOBACCO CONTROL 166, 166 (2005).
228. Id. at 169, 171. Key to its effectiveness was that the policy change was widely publicized and
was part of a coordinated tobacco control strategy by the Department of Health. Id. at 171.
229. Kozlowski et al., supra note 202, at 2143. However, reducing the cost of NRT so it is
comparable to the cost of smoking may not be enough. Whereas the money a smoker is willing to spend
on cigarettes is influenced by addiction and by the pleasure received from smoking, smokers using NRT
encounter the discomfort of stopping smoking and must overcome this cost as well when purchasing
NRT. Id.
230. Shu-Hong Zhu et al., Smoking Cessation With and Without Assistance, 18 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. 305, 309-10 (2000). When NRT was available by prescription, many consumers paid much less
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Finally, and most importantly, the public health, scientific, and regulatory
communities must collaborate to develop NRT products that are more appealing to
smokers and more responsive to their long-term needs for staying tobacco free.
Current medicinal nicotine products contain relatively low doses of nicotine and
were developed for short-term use to help smokers quit. 231 Thus, there is "much
room and opportunity to formulate [new NRT] products with consumer appeal in
mind" 232-products that offer more long-term options for smokers who cannot
break their nicotine addiction in just twelve weeks, and that offer a better substitute
for cigarettes than snus and other smokeless tobacco products. Developing
improved products will also promote NRT use by providing a new option for
smokers who have negative impressions about current NRT products or have used
them unsuccessfully in the past.
The tobacco control environment has been set so that now is a promising time
to capitalize on the potential for NRT products to help smokers quit. Many pieces
are in place for a substantial increase in smoking cessation rates, including higher
tobacco taxes, clean indoor-air laws, and cessation campaigns in the media.233 The
tobacco industry is aware of the current strong public anti-smoking attitude and that
it is becoming more difficult for smokers to maintain their habit. The industry, in
the interest of self-preservation, has responded by introducing a new product-
snus-for use when smokers may not or choose not to smoke.234 The public health
community must respond as well. Rather than join forces with the tobacco industry
by supporting the use of snus, thereby aiding the industry's goal of increasing the
number of people addicted to tobacco products, the public health community
should construct its own response that will serve the goals of tobacco control. Such
a response must include developing new NRT products and increasing their
accessibility and appeal to smokers through education and price-decreasing
measures. If the public health community is going to promote another form of
nicotine delivery as an alternative to cigarettes, then it should promote a product
that is safe, that is appealing to consumers, and that will not create a new tobacco
crisis.235 Snus does not fit those criteria.
for it because their insurers covered most of the cost. Id. Hence, encouraging or legally requiring
insurers to cover over-the-counter NRT may help increase access to and use of NRT.
231. KATHLEEN MEISTER, AM. COUNCIL ON SC. & HEALTH, HELPING SMOKERS QUIT: A ROLE FOR
SMOKELESS TOBACCO? 4 (2006), available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/I9896.pdf.
232. Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 470. Already, about 6% of smokers who use nicotine gum to
help them quit keep using it for at least six months. Id. at 463. This suggests that smokers may be
interested in more continuous use of NRT products to help them stay smoke free. Id. at 470.
233. Orleans, supra note 206, at S341.
234. Hundley, supra note 54, at Cl.
235. Shiffman et al., supra note 201, at 470-71 ("If it is deemed appropriate policy to promote
alternative forms of nicotine delivery... products that are safest and most appealing to smokers should
be the focus of such public health strategies.").
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CONCLUSION
"[T]here is no natural law that says that [thirty] percent of the population
should be nicotine addicts. ,236
The tobacco control community already may be running out of time to craft a
cohesive response to the new snus products that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris
have brought to the market and are preparing to make available and promote on a
wide scale. Although some experts argue that snus is relatively harmless-and
maybe even beneficial for public health-in reality snus could potentially destroy
much of the progress the tobacco control community has thus far achieved. Rather
than aid the tobacco industry in its effort to sustain and increase tobacco use in the
U.S., the public health community must independently take steps to continue
solving the tobacco problem. Because snus is a new step by the tobacco industry to
maintain its economic success and increase the appeal of tobacco products to U.S.
consumers, the public health community must also take new steps. Such steps
include arguing for a ban on snus; supporting passage of the FDA bill currently
being considered by Congress; encouraging states to pass taxes on the sale of snus;
launch education and marketing campaigns to discourage snus use; and enforce the
MSA provisions and consumer protection laws against the tobacco industry in its
marketing of snus; and promoting the development of new NRT products that will
provide an alternative form of "clean nicotine" for current tobacco users. These
steps are consistent with the long-term goals of tobacco control and must be
implemented before snus creates a new tobacco crisis in the U.S.
236. Hundley, supra note 54, at CI (emphasis added) (quoting Goran Pershagen, Professor Envtl.
Hygiene at Stockholm's Karolinska Inst.).
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